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“justice as equal regard”—the equal
right of besieged victims to have force
used on their behalf.
Those of us who serve or have served in
the military often draw our battle lines
starkly: black and white, good and evil,
us and them. This crucial book offers a
chastening reminder not only of the
many shades of gray needed to nuance a
view of religion as it relates to global security in a confusing new age but also
of the richly colorful tapestry woven by
religious ideas and approaches to political problems. If that doesn’t persuade,
then simply recall the book’s thesis: nations that respect religion’s role in the
world are far more secure than those
that do not.
JOHN D. CARLSON

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Arizona State University

Sawyer, Ralph D. The Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence
Theory and Practice in Traditional China. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2004. 617pp.

Ralph Sawyer continues his work on
Chinese political and military writings
with The Tao of Spycraft. The title, however, may be somewhat misleading.
Rather than compartmentalizing intelligence separate from other endeavors,
Sawyer demonstrates how intelligence
is an integral aspect of war, diplomacy,
and politics.
A sampling of current war college articles shows a strong interest in “integrating all elements of national power,” for
which the Defense Department uses the
acronym DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). Sawyer
demonstrates that this was a common
concept thousands of years ago in China.
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Diplomatic maneuvers, economic
inducements, propaganda, and whispering campaigns were all an essential
element of statecraft. Most important,
unlike our contemporary U.S. attitudes,
intelligence was not isolated as some
kind of supporting activity or a commodity accessed when needed but an
integral part of all state activities.
The book is divided into six parts: Early
History, Spycraft, Covert Activities,
Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence,
Military Intelligence, and Prognostication, Divination, and Nonhuman Factors. Each part contains several topical
chapters, each rich with examples from
Chinese history. For example, part 4
(Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence), chapter 10 (“Basic Theory and
Issues”) provides a primer on critical
thinking and evaluation as good as any
contemporary U.S. intelligence text. It
addresses analytic biases and prejudices,
how to judge the reliability and credibility of sources, how to make assessments on limited information, and
confidence levels of assessments—all issues the intelligence community must
continually address.
Several common concepts run the
length of the book. The first is the integration of intelligence into statecraft.
Another is the view that intelligence is
essentially a human endeavor. The
statesman, the general, and the spymaster must understand both human
nature in general and the personalities
of their colleagues, allies, and enemies
in particular.
This work is not without flaws. It cries
out for maps, especially political maps
of the “Spring and Autumn” and “Warring States” periods. The book assumes
that the reader has a basic understanding of traditional Chinese history and
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culture; some sections may be hard going for the casual reader. Parts of the
book are rather dry; this reflects the extensive translations more than the author’s style. But for serious students of
China, intelligence tradecraft, or information operations, this book provides
essential understanding of contemporary Chinese statecraft.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Ret.)
Centreville, Va.

Graham, Euan. Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 1940–
2004: A Matter of Life and Death? New York:
Routledge, 2006. 320pp. $115

As the first English-language analysis of
its kind, Graham’s comprehensive case
study fills a critical gap in the literature
concerning the maritime dimension of
Japanese national security. This is an
exciting issue at a dynamic time: in
October 2004, Japan’s Maritime SelfDefense Force (MSDF) and coast guard
led Northeast Asia’s first Proliferation
Security Initiative exercise. In the Indian Ocean, the MSDF is currently fuelling allied vessels to support operations
in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Japan is
struggling to assert control over its exclusive economic zones, the boundaries
of which are increasingly contested by
China and South Korea.
Graham (currently a British government researcher at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office’s North Asia and
Pacific Research Group) draws on fresh,
original sources, including Japaneselanguage documents and interviews
with Japanese officials, to demonstrate
that while Japan’s defense and foreign
policy have changed dramatically since
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its opening up to the world in 1853,
sea-lane security has been an enduring
national security concern. Graham offers insight into Japanese leaders’ and
analysts’ perceptions of their nation’s
own security context, thereby avoiding
the tendency of much related scholarship to view matters exclusively through
the prism of relations with the United
States.
Graham situates resource-poor Japan in
its geographic context: “Although at
nearly 30,000 km, Japan’s coastline is
one-third longer than that of the
United States, no inland point is more
than 150 km from the sea.” He explains
Japan’s historical concern with the security of its sea lines of communication
(SLOC), citing official Diet testimony
that “the greatest cause of [Japan’s
World War II] defeat was the loss of
shipping” to the Allied blockade. Graham
records a recent manifestation of Japanese SLOC concerns: Prime Minister
(1996–98) Ryutaro Hashimoto’s worry
that “many commercial flights and aircraft [were] forced to divert around
those areas affected” by China’s March
1996 missile tests, during which “some
of the missiles landed in waters only 60
km from [Japan’s] Yonaguni island.”
Graham’s analysis is well written, organized, and documented; based on numerous, very current data; and highly
accessible to the reader. It is thus an essential reference for analysts of East
Asian security.
Given this significant achievement, one
hopes that Graham and other scholars
will conduct follow-up research concerning such areas relevant to Japan’s
future SLOC security as China’s maritime legal and naval development. Some
assessments may need to be revisited as
additional data becomes available. For
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